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Abstract
The issues of the ethical evaluation of withholding or withdrawing of medical treatment have been the
subject of discussions among doctors, lawmakers, philosophers and theologians for centuries. Historical
analyses have shown that there are two prominent traditions, which have, throughout the centuries, pro-
duced the most vital ideas concerning the matter in question. The first one relates to Hippocrates, the father
of Hellenic medicine, the other to the Christian reflection on uses of medicine.
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Introduction
The fierce expansion of new technologies, which
we have been witnessing for the past decades, along
with immense development of medical sciences in
the fields of diagnostics, pharmacology, and meth-
ods of treatment seemed to fulfil the hopes of man-
kind for an unlimited means of saving and support-
ing life. Medicine has been able to overcome many
of the problems that have plagued mankind since
the dawn of time. However, the unquestioned
progress has also brought negative aspects of inva-
sive therapies, which have become apparent with
time. The subject of establishing boundaries for cer-
tain medical interventions has been raised. This con-
text was the source of coining the phrase "medical
futility" back in the 1970s. As we can see, this term
has a relatively short history. Nonetheless, the idea
of renouncing treatment in certain cases was brought
up many centuries ago. This article is an effort to
present the two main trends that took up the issue.
Ancient evidence
Various opinions concerning the subject of with-
drawing from medical interventions appeared as
early as in ancient times. The oldest manuscripts —
the Code of Hammurabi and the Egyptian papyrus-
es of Smith and Ebers — given their different char-
acter (legal document, compendium of knowledge
on surgery, textbook of medicine), may be consid-
ered evidence that the practical medical skills of
doctors were treated with great attention and ap-
preciated in distant antiquity. It is also characteris-
tic that even then some medical practices were au-
thoritatively prohibited because of their negative
consequences.
The Babylonian Code (18th century B.C.) defines
the legal consequences of two types of medical in-
terventions: surgeries carried out using a knife made
of bronze and operations on the superciliary arch.
Successful medical interventions authorised the doc-
tor to demand payment. However, if the operation
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caused the death of the patient or the loss of an
eye, the surgeon would face serious punishment,
including the cutting off his hand or having to pay
compensation. The Code, a boundary, which, if
crossed by doctors, would result in severe conse-
quences. This made the law play a preventive role
and doctors had to exercise caution and sensibility
in their actions. The ancient lawmaker considers the
operation, which results in harm to the patient as
a contravention of the doctors’ competences and
charges them with responsibility for improper use
of medical skills [1].
The Edwin Smith Papyrus is a valuable source of
information on ancient Egyptian surgery. The trea-
tise, drawn up in the 17th century B.C., contains
descriptions of almost fifty medical cases. The au-
thor of the treatise focuses mostly on locating and
properly interpreting the symptoms that suggest the
type of ilness the patient suffers from. This consti-
tutes the basis for making a diagnosis. The papyrus
content lists three types of medical certificates and
divides complaints into: curable per se, potentially
curable and incurable. The Egyptian physician rec-
ommends a withdrawal from any type of therapy in
sixteen cases. The case that surprises us, with the
knowledge of physiology and the precise description
of pathological changes resulting from a dislocation
of the cervical vertebrae, is particularly interesting.
The patient is able to breathe, but he has lost control
over his limbs and the sexual functions of the body.
The instruction for a dislocation of the cervical verte-
brae. If you are examining a man with a dislocation
of the cervical vertebra and pronounce the lack of
control (and sensation) in both hands and legs, which,
in turn, makes his member erect, while urine leaves
the body uncontrollably (without the patient realis-
ing it), his body absorbs the wind and eyes become
bloodshot, it means that this is a dislocation of the
cervical vertebra that affects his spinal cord and makes
his arms and legs numb. His member may produce
semen if the central cervical vertebrae are dislocated.
You are to offer the following diagnosis: he has a
dislocated cervical vertebra, no control in his legs
and arms, and he cannot withhold urine. Such a
complaint cannot be cured [2]. Another Ebers Papy-
rus (second half of the 16th century B.C.), which is
considered to be an ancient textbook on medicine,
also lists a case in which the doctor is advised not to
take any actions against the diagnosed illness [3]. It
is worth mentioning, that many ancient philosophers
demonstrated much interest in various aspects of
the human health condition, which translated into
making their own opinions on the medicine of the
time. We can find explicit statements considering
the legitimacy or futility of treatment in the works
of Plato (437–347 B.C.), although they dealt only
with the theory and left the practice to doctors [4].
The two dominant traditions
Over the centuries, the theory of withdrawing
from futile medical interventions in certain cases was
universally accepted, even though there were some
isolated and sporadic voices of authors who strong-
ly rejected the thought of renouncing therapy. The
idea that doctors should abandon any efforts to
treat a patient was dominant in medical circles. Co-
incidental opinions can also be found in non-medi-
cal deliberations, which state that patients may re-
nounce the obligation to cure themselves, provided
that they have specific and important reasons. We
can point to two historically dominant philosophi-
cal trends: the first one referring to the legacy of
Hippocrates (the medical trend), the other corre-
sponding to the theological and philosophical tra-
dition of Christianity (the Christian trend). Both
trends are not mutually exclusive; quite the con-
trary, they seem to complement each other and
take up the same issues, but from different per-
spectives. The medical trend originates from the
experiences of physicians, while the Christian trend
mostly deals with the attitudes of patients [5].
The Hippocratic tradition
The medicine of Ancient Greece is inherently con-
nected with the legendary figure of Hippocrates of
Kos (around 460–377 B.C.). He was born in the fam-
ily of Asclepius, which passed medical skills on from
generation to generation. He was a highly esteemed
doctor of his times. He not only had his own private
medical practice, but he also trained others to be-
come doctors. Hippocrates created his own theory
for diseases, according to which, diseases are caused
by the lack of balance between the four main hu-
mours (blood, phlegm, yellow bile and black bile)
[6]. The texts that make up the Hippocratic Corpus
contain the threads that comment on the futility of
medical interventions.
The work “The Art” precisely defines three fun-
damental tasks, which form the foundation of med-
icine. It is to free patients from suffering, bring re-
lief in illness and refrain from treating those pa-
tients who became completely overcome with dis-
ease, as medicine is helpless in such cases [7]. The
last statement must have been a source of much
controversy at the time, since the author himself
states in his further deliberations, that there are
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people who blame medicine for refraining from deal-
ing with hopeless cases [8]. It is beyond any doubt,
that the ancient writer thought the limitations of
medicine were obvious. Therefore, he did not hesi-
tate to dismiss the accusations of opponents and
say that those who demand medicine to cure the
incurable should rather be considered madmen than
just people who lack the necessary knowledge. Con-
sequently, we should cure the diseases that can be
cured, but also diagnose those which we can do
nothing about, in order to understand the reason
for our helplessness [9]. The author adds that in
such hopeless cases, one must do whatever is in his
capacity, and to seek the well-being of the patient
for as long as possible. Another self-explanatory tip
on withdrawal from medical interventions is given
by Hippocrates in his Aphorisms: It is better to give
no treatment in cases of hidden cancer; treatment
causes speedy death, but to omit treatment is to
prolong life [10]. Therapeutic determination must
be confronted with rational boundaries. The last of
Hippocrates’ aphorisms reads: Those diseases that
medicines do not cure are cured by the knife. Those
that knife does not cure are cured by fire. Those
that fire does not cure must be considered incur-
able [11]. Hippocrates and his views were very pop-
ular in his times. They are quoted in many other
works by ancient authors, who cite his opinions
and authority in relation to specific life situations.
Greek ideals found many eager followers in subse-
quent centuries. It may seem that medieval doctors
(e.g. Avicenna, Maimonides) [12] did not introduce
any revolutionary elements to the discussion con-
cerning withdrawal from futile medical interven-
tions. It appears that they just copied the ideas that
originated in ancient times and only slightly updat-
ed them with the latest medical development and
social conventions concerning the practice of medi-
cine. The role of doctors towards the terminally ill
has been formulated anew. It translated into a deep-
er understanding of the doctor-patient relationship,
which goes beyond the pattern of health-restoring
services and medicine development (mostly phar-
macology). The doctor’s scope of responsibility has
been supplemented with the concern for the well-
being of the terminally ill patient. As a result, in
cases when prolonging therapeutic activities would
prove futile, such activities were replaced with those
aimed at bringing relief in suffering. Those doctors
who refrained from performing particular medical
interventions would not leave the patient to his
misery, but redefined the profiles of their activities.
The conclusion is that the key element in determin-
ing the moral aspect of one’s activities is not only
professional treatment, but also doing all there can
be done to prevent the terminally ill patients from
suffering. The allegiance to this objective is the evi-
dence for the unique character of medicine. A doc-
tor’s vocation has not lost any of its ancient arche-
typal aspects and, given this aspect, is still a re-
minder of the situation of an ancient Roman legion-
naire who would take an oath to protect the Caesar
and the Empire, even if it would claim his life [13].
The Middle Ages gave a clear outline of the new
scope of responsibilities and requirements for doc-
tors, in view of which leaving a terminally-ill patient
to their own fate (what would be seen as staying
faithful to the principles of medicine in the times of
Hippocrates) would be considered a betrayal of the
profession. Modern Codes of Doctor’s Conduct have
discussed the issue in the same light. Such codes
deliver practical solutions and do not go into details
in the issues of justifications that accompany specific
regulations, which is understandable in the context
of such documents. They empower doctors with the
right to refrain from performing certain medical in-
terventions, albeit patients should have their sup-
port and relief in suffering, even when there is no
hope for recovery.
The Christian tradition
The interpretations of the views typical for the
Christian trend are the points worked out in the scho-
lastic treaties of moral theology. They have become
an inherent part of the broadly understood intellec-
tual tradition of theology and philosophy, once orig-
inated by Church Fathers [14]. Christian philosophers
have demonstrated great interest in the practical is-
sues concerning human life and health. The active
and creative academic life of the Dominicans and
Jesuits in the 16th and 17th centuries contributed to
the creation of certain ethical standards, as well as
to the consolidation of the ethical interpretation for
typical moral dilemmas, which were emerging from
medical practice of the time. The discussion held
between theologians on the subject of refraining
from treatment included three fundamental elements:
the absolute condemnation of suicide - unquestion-
able in the Christian world, the imperative to provide
sagacious protection of life and health, and the pos-
sibility to withdraw from using too oppressive medi-
cations. They accepted the idea of abandoning ther-
apy and even withdrawing from a special diet used
in illness, mostly because of the psychological or
financial barriers that were inextricably linked with
treatment. Thomas Aquinas (1224/5–1274), who the
first to state that it is a fundamental moral require-
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ment to have the patient's consent before aggres-
sive therapy is introduced. According to this con-
cept, patients who are sane cannot be forced to
undergo hazardous and painful treatments. They
are particularly not obliged to use any means nec-
essary to restore health or prolong life [15]. For
instance, Leonard Lessius (1554–1623), a Flemish
Jesuit who lived three centuries after Thomas
Aquinas claimed that a person is required to allow
his organ to be amputated, if doctors deem it nec-
essary and there was no danger of great pain (...)
The fact that the patient is bound to save his life
using standard measures which are not complicat-
ed would call for such a solution. However, if a
patient is to suffer severe pain, he does not have to
agree nor be forced to undergo such an operation.
The reason for that being that nobody is required
to hold onto life enduring such suffering, when the
prognosis is not certain [16]. Furthermore, Leonard
Lessius points out to psychological barriers that oc-
cur when one is to undergo a therapy. (…) women,
especially virgins, are not required to let men to
treat the secret parts of their bodies (…) The reason
for that being that nobody has to agree to a treat-
ment that seems as abhorrent as the illness or death
itself: many modest virgins would rather endure
disease or death than be touched by men. There-
fore, no one is required to agree to something that
relates to the danger of improper actions or carnal
satisfaction. But that's not all — one would consid-
er death to attain heroic purity than let others have
indecent thoughts or experience lustful gestures
[17]. Although today such words may seem a little
archaic, they demonstrate a wide spectrum of justi-
fications that would dismiss any potential treat-
ment. John Lugo (1583–1660), another philosopher,
continues the tradition of his predecessors. He
claimed that people should agree to treatment when
the doctor deems it necessary and when it does not
cause severe pain; however, they do not have to
give their consent when treatment would cause
great pain, as no man is obliged to use extraordi-
nary and difficult measures to save life [18]. Making
efforts aimed at postponing impending death is
not always required.
Throughout subsequent centuries, other genera-
tions of Christian philosophers and moral theolo-
gians repeated the views of their predecessors, with-
out adding any new elements to the universal theory
concerning the means of life support. Those philoso-
phers would stick to their traditional views, even when
treatments and operations no longer terrified pa-
tients, as the middle of the 19th century introduced
much more effective anaesthetics. The fact that these
made aggressive medical interventions much safer
and less painful was treated with great reserve [19].
Conclusion
This article shows only a part of the multifacet-
ed history of views concerning withdrawal from fu-
tile medical interventions. It is to be emphasised
that both trends (medical and Christian) which orig-
inated in ancient times, have made it throughout
the centuries and evolved. Both of them have one
voice in claiming that it is moral to refrain from
treatment in certain cases.
The medical trend is part of the Hippocratic mod-
el of medicine, which makes it, above all, an endeav-
our based on rational reasons. This attitude prohib-
its taking up treatment when there is no hope for
recovery and such efforts would be considered as
futile and harmful to the prestige of medicine [20].
The logic demands to match clinical facts with real
skills. Doctors operate in a precisely defined frame-
work, shaped by the nature of the science. A doctor
is, first and foremost, a servant to his art. This is the
reason why the representatives of this trend point to
the erroneousness that the art of medicine is subject
to [21]. This presents medicine in a rather awkward
light, but at the same clearly defines its limits, leav-
ing no doubt that only those actions of doctors,
which yield to the requirements of critical thinking,
may be approved. Treatment, once commenced, must
be completed. Withdrawing from therapy was de-
scribed with the same term as soldier’s desertion as
early as in the Hippocratic Corpus [22]. Given this
standard of conduct, we can clearly differentiate be-
tween a professional, who is responsible and ho-
nours his service, from a quack [23]. The doctor is
obliged to know the limitations of his professional
skills and never go beyond them, so as to (…) use
treatment help sick according to my ability and
judgement, but never with a view to injury and
wrong-doing [24] — as the words of the Hippocrat-
ic Oath express it. Patients are those who pay the
cost of unnecessary treatments. Treatment is to be
started when such intervention is necessary, but it
is to be refrained from with complete awareness of
the consequences when it is not.
The theory of ordinary and extraordinary mea-
sures, created in the 16th century, was undoubtedly
a great achievement. Authors of ethical and theo-
logical dissertations seldom addressed themselves
directly to the doctors or their specific duties to-
wards the terminally ill. The texts included in moral
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treaties were never directly addressed to profes-
sional doctors. Most of them were written to ad-
dress the needs of the academic institutions that
educated Catholic clergy. Unlike explanations in-
spired by Christianity, the views of many philoso-
phers in relation to the issues of withdrawing from
medical interventions were usually very pessimistic.
They constituted a varied and very diversified mosa-
ic. The ethics they presented, albeit there were ex-
ceptions, were not interested in protecting the rights
of the weak, who required special care, but rather
emphasised and expanded the power of the strong
(Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus) or absolved the freedom
of men, approving of euthanasia (F. Bacon, D.
Hume). Having this in mind, we can consider the
Christian and Hippocratic trends as mature and well
consolidated in terms of theory, offering moral so-
lutions relating to the issue of withdrawing from
futile medical interventions.
References
1. Kodeks Hammurabiego § 215–223. Stępień M. (trans.).
Warszawa 1996: 124–125.
2. Breasted J.H. (ed.). The Edwin Smith Surgical Papyrus. Pub-
lished in Facsimile and Hieroglyphic Transliteration with
Translation and Commentary in Two Volumes, t. I, Chica-
go 1930: 452–453.
3. Bryan C. P. (ed.). The Papyrus Ebers. Oldest Medical Book
in the World, New York 1990: 149.
4. Platon. Państwo 406B-C. Witwicki W. (trans.). Warsza-
wa 1958: 169.
5. Aszyk P. Granice leczenia. Etyczny problem odstąpienia
od interwencji medycznych. Warszawa 2006: 13–61.
6. Poter R. The Greatest Benefit to Mankind. A Medical His-
tory of Humanity. New York 1999: 55–59.
7. Hippocrates. The Art III. In: Jones W.H.S. Hippocrates with
an English Translation. Cambridge 1967; II: 192.
8. Hippocrates. The Art VIII : In: Jones W.H.S. Hippocrates
with an English Translation. Cambridge 1967; II: 202.
9. Hippocrates. Diseases I6. In: Potter P. Hippocrates with
an English Translation.  Cambridge 1988; V: 112.
10. Hippocrates. Aphorisms VI 38. In: Jones W.H.S. Hippo-
crates with An English Translation. Cambridge 1998; IV:
189.
11. Hippocrates. Aphorisms VII 87. In: Jones W.H.S. Hippo-
crates with An English Translation. Cambridge 1998; IV:
217.
12. Avicenna. A Treatise on the Canon of Medicine of Avicen-
na 684–687. New York 1970: 361; Rosner F. Content and
Analysis of Maimonides’ Commentary on the Aphorisms
of Hippocrates. In: Maimonides’ Commentary on the Aph-
orisms of Hippocrates. Haifa 1987: 1–3.
13. Jonsen A. R. The Short History of Medical Ethics. New
York 2000: 10.
14. Cronin D. A. The Moral Law in Regarding to Ordinary and
Extraordinary Means of Conserving Life. In: Smith R.E.
(ed.). Conserving Human Life. Braintree 1989: 33–66.
15. Tomasz z Akwinu. Suma teologiczna. II–II, q. 65, a. 1.3,
vol. XVIII. Londyn 1970: 124.
16. Lessius L., De justitia et Jure Ceterisque Virtutibus Cardi-
nalibus. Lib. II, Cap. 9, dub. 14, n. 96. Antverpiae 1609:
101.
17. Lessius L. De justitia et Jure Ceterisque Virtutibus Cardi-
nalibus. Lib. IV, Cap. 3, dub. 8, n. 60: 757.
18. Lugo J. De. De Justitia et Jure, Disp. 10, Sect. I, n. 21. In:
Lugo J. De. Disputationes Scholasticae et Morales, VI. Lun-
gundi 1642: 256.
19. Collins H. J. The morality of withdrawing or withholding
food and fluid administered artificially to the individual in
the persistent vegetative state from Roman Catholic per-
spective. Ann. Arbor. 1988: 104–106.
20. Sigerist H. E. A History of Medicine. New York 1961; II:
299.
21. Philips E. D. Aspects of Greek Medicine. New York 1973:
114–115.
22. Jouanna J. Hippocrates. Baltimore 1999: 140.
23. Edelstein L. The Professional Ethics of The Greek Physi-
cian. In: Temkin O. Temkin C.L. (ed.). Ancient Medicine.
Selected Papers of Ludwig Edelstein. Baltimore 1967: 323–
–324.
24. Hippocrates. Oath. In: Jones W.H.S. Hippocrates with
an English Translation. Cambridge 1995; I: 299.

